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Juvenile Justice in Florida: 
What Kind of Future? 
 
Executive Summary 
 
 The National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) conducted a study to 
determine the potential benefits to Florida of adopting a data-driven approach to juvenile 
corrections that is based on the best national research. The NCCD relied heavily on the 
Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability (OPPAGA) reports and 
supplemented these with additional data collection to answer the following questions:  
 
Is the current structure of detention and commitment programs for youthful offenders 
guided by the most research-supported strategies? NCCD found that Florida is making 
modest progress in operating programs that are informed by the best research, but that much 
more needs to be done. It is NCCD’s conclusion that the Florida Department of Juvenile 
Justice (DJJ) possesses a sophisticated research capacity and potential, but this capacity is not 
being fully utilized for program planning or to improve operations. Although the state of 
Florida does have programs that have proven effective through rigorous national research 
studies, such as drug courts, Multisystemic Therapy (MST), and wraparound services, there 
needs to be more rather than less of these programs available to the juvenile court. Programs 
such as Associated Marine Institutes, Youth Advocacy Programs (YAP), and high-quality, 
gender-specific programming such as the PACE Center for Girls, are promising programs 
that have been evaluated and that incorporate a variety of characteristics of effective 
programs. In general, we found that  
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research-tested, home-based services such as wraparound programs are underutilized in 
Florida. Additionally, there does not appear to be a strong aftercare component within the 
Florida juvenile justice continuum for the most serious, chronic offender. 
 
Is the state making maximum use of its fiscal resources to protect public safety and 
promote the rehabilitation needs of youth in the juvenile justice system? NCCD found 
that presently there is no effective system that matches the control and supervision needs of 
youth with the residential programs that are funded. Furthermore, there is not a sound 
forecasting system used by the department to determine future needs for beds or program 
spaces. As a consequence, DJJ reacts to what beds or community treatment slots are 
available. Ad hoc decisions to defund successful programs, remove day treatment as a front-
end alternative, and use of moderate risk programs for low-risk youths (because of the 
absence of treatment in the low-risk programs) are not cost-effective strategies and appear to 
not take into account an understanding of systemic consequences.  
 
Are the needs identified by local communities, including judges, state attorney, law 
enforcement officials and youth advocates, reflected in state juvenile justice 
programming? Floridians across the state call for more early prevention and treatment 
options and support their importance at a time when significant cuts to prevention programs 
have been proposed. When local representatives were asked about gaps in services and the 
types of new programs that are needed, responses ranged from specialized services for youth 
to wraparound, intensive services that include the entire family. At the individual level: 
mental health services, programs for girls, programs for younger youth, programs for 
  4
runaway incorrigible youth, continuum for sex offenders, and minority youth services were 
among the popular responses. At the system level, the need for trained, quality staff; proper 
assessment and identification of the need for appropriate placement; education and support 
for youth offenders with children; programs that are closer to home so that family can visit; 
life skills curriculum; and aftercare services were among the most popular responses from the 
people with whom we talked. Representatives from local communities are expressing that, in 
order for youth to be better served, funding priorities need to shift, new programs need to be 
implemented, and specific policy changes need to occur. It does not appear that much of the 
local input and comprehensive planning is incorporated in current DJJ policies and 
programming. NCCD recommends that the DJJ plan ways to channel more resources at the 
local level and leave more discretion for programming to judges and community officials, as 
other states have done. 
 
Important Trends 
 
 Florida is experiencing the lowest levels of juvenile committed crime since DJJ was 
created in 1994. At the same time, Florida is also experiencing a growth in the population of 
youth ages 10-17. Important trends in youth population, juvenile crime, detention, 
commitment, and recidivism in Florida are highlighted. It is important to note that it would 
be expected that juvenile commitments would be declining, as the rates of juvenile crime and 
seriousness of offenses decline. Issues regarding detention, girls in juvenile justice programs, 
and disproportionate minority representation are also discussed in this report. These trends 
present opportunities for implementing alternative programs and policies. 
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Implications of alternative programs and policies 
 If Florida implemented research-based programs that are responsive to local needs, 
the State could make better use of current fiscal resources. NCCD estimates that as much as 
$42 million of existing DJJ expenditures could be spent on smarter placement strategies. 
These monies could be made available to enrich prevention and early intervention programs 
at the front end of the system. Additionally, these funds could be reinvested to enrich 
treatment services in residential programs, and to recruit and retain better staff. In this report, 
NCCD simulated the cost-savings effect of three options for implementing research-tested 
alternative programs and policies. The options presented are very conservative estimates 
about the proportion of youth that could qualify for alternative programming. The report ends 
with a set of specific recommendations for next steps for DJJ and the Legislature. 
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Juvenile Justice in Florida: 
What Kind of Future? 
I. Introduction 
 
 The National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) conducted a study to 
determine the potential benefits to Florida of adopting a data-driven approach to juvenile 
corrections that is based on the best national research. The Council’s goal is to stimulate a 
vigorous public discussion of the future of juvenile justice in Florida. 
This study seeks to complement the excellent ongoing work of the Florida Office of 
Program Policy and Government Accountability (OPPAGA), an office of the Florida 
Legislature that provides evaluative research and objective analyses to promote government 
accountability and efficient and effective use of public resources. But this study goes beyond 
the issues of analyzing the vacancy rates of Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) beds and 
the process for tracking capacity and utilization within DJJ. NCCD has assessed the potential 
impact of alternative program and policy options and provided recommendations that move 
towards a model continuum of graduated sanctions. Our work is closely informed by the 
approach to graduated sanctions that is part of the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, 
Chronic, and Violent Offenders developed by the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) (Howell ed., 1995). 
NCCD has performed similar analyses for states such as Louisiana, Georgia, 
Maryland, New Jersey, Colorado, and Indiana, and for the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s 
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Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) (1997). This Florida study was funded by a 
generous grant from the Jessie Ball duPont Fund. 
 Since its beginning in 1907, NCCD has been at the forefront of juvenile justice 
reform, especially designing program strategies and policies to help communities place youth 
in settings that best meet their needs for services and the community’s need for public 
protection. It is NCCD’s position that placement decisions should be based on clearly defined 
objective criteria focusing on the seriousness of the delinquent act, the youth’s risk of 
continued offending, and the individual’s need for services. Many juvenile justice systems 
across the country are being criticized for inappropriate or inconsistent placement decisions. 
They are also dealing with youth needs that are currently overwhelming available resources 
with dramatically rising costs. Additionally, worker liability is increasing—that is, large 
workloads mean less knowledge about individual cases. States that are expanding 
community-based programs need to know which youth can safely be placed in these 
programs.  
 NCCD produced a report on promising graduated sanctions for the OJJDP. A model 
system of graduated sanctions combines treatment and rehabilitation with reasonable, fair, 
humane, and appropriate restrictions. This system also offers a continuum of care that 
consists of diverse programs—immediate sanctions programs, intermediate sanctions, secure 
care programs, and aftercare programs. Research has shown that community-based graduated 
sanctions programs appear to be at least as successful as traditional incarceration in reducing 
recidivism, and the most well-structured graduated sanctions programs appear to be more 
effective than incarceration (Krisberg, 2003). 
 
  8
 Our study was guided by three core questions: 
• Is the current mix of detention and commitment programs for youthful offenders 
guided by the most research-supported strategies? 
• Is the state making maximum use of its fiscal resources to protect public safety and 
promote the rehabilitative needs of youth in the juvenile justice system? 
• Are the needs identified by local communities, including judges, state attorneys, law 
enforcement officials, and youth advocates reflected in state juvenile justice 
programming? 
 
 In Florida, more and more youth are being placed into commitment programs at a 
time when the overall juvenile crime rates have been declining. From national research, we 
know that many of these youth can be better served by intensive home-based services, and 
shorter institutional stays, followed by very high quality reentry services (Krisberg, 2003). 
The Florida juvenile justice system could do a lot to improve its processes of assessment and 
placement. Attention to classification and placement decision making systems could produce 
short- and long-term fiscal savings as well as better outcomes for youths. At this point, in 
Florida, there is not a model system of structural decision making (SDM) based on objective 
risk criteria to find appropriate placement for youth. DJJ has parts of this system, but it is not 
fully implemented, nor does it appear that some of the excellent research-based tools 
developed by DJJ are being used to guide long-term budget and planning decisions. 
 Currently, there are many program types and models within the residential 
programming DJJ budget, but they are insufficiently linked and integrated to comprise a real 
continuum of care.  
  9
 In order to inventory the types of services and program gaps, NCCD spoke with many 
professionals who work directly with youth. Input from groups and individuals included 
Florida youth advocates, representatives of community-based programs, DJJ central office 
and field staff, judges, state’s attorneys, public defenders, and law enforcement officials. 
These viewpoints were integrated with available data and the best national research to form 
recommendations about needed policies and programs. The following sections will examine 
the extent to which the state of Florida is moving toward a model system of graduated 
sanctions that is research-based, cost-effective, and responsive to local needs. 
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II. Background 
  
 The Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) was created in 1994. The Juvenile 
Justice Act of 1994 removed the responsibilities for many juvenile justice programs from 
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), a social service agency, and 
created a new criminal justice state agency to oversee juvenile justice (effective Oct. 1, 
1994). The Secretary of DJJ is appointed by the Governor and is charged with planning for 
and managing all programs and services including prevention, Children in Need of 
Services/Families in Need of Services (CINS/FINS), intervention and diversion, case 
management, detention care, contracted community-based commitment programs, state-
operated juvenile justice institutions and families, and aftercare programming. Throughout 
the decade of the 1990s, Floridians were interested in the local planning aspects of juvenile 
justice. However, changes in laws and DJJ policies have shifted the focus from local 
initiatives. Differences between the 1990 and 1994 Florida Juvenile Justice Reform Acts are 
noted in the table below. Essentially, reforms enacted in 1994 increased the length of stay in 
detention and provided facilities for maximum-risk serious offenders. In 2000, the 
Department of Juvenile Justice was restructured to create five program and budget areas: 
prevention and victim services, detention, residential and correctional facilities, probation 
and community corrections, and administration. Whereas the Juvenile Justice Act of 1994 
had local components of 15 DJJ districts across the state, this new law eliminated them; thus, 
DJJ operations became more centralized.  
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Juvenile Justice Act of 1990 Juvenile Justice Act of 1994 
Created statewide risk tool to limit detention Created overrides of risk tool for several minor 
offenses 
Emphasized less restrictive alternatives De-emphasized less restrictive alternatives  
Limited post-adjudicatory detention Removed limits from post-adjudicatory detention 
Restricted pre-adjudicatory detention eligibility Expanded pre-adjudicatory detention eligibility  
Detention was not used for punishment Allowed detention to be used as punishment 
Reduced deep-end placements Expanded deep-end placements  
Source: Bishop and Griset, 1999, pg 22 
 
The budget for juvenile justice has more than doubled since the separate department was 
created. Today, approximately $620 million are appropriated for the operation of the 
Department of Juvenile Justice compared to approximately $300 million in FY 1994-95.  
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III. Trends 
 
 Florida is experiencing the lowest levels of juvenile crime since DJJ was created in 
1994. At the same time, Florida is also experiencing a growth in the population of youth ages 
10-17. The following section highlights some important trends in youth population, juvenile 
crime, detention, commitment, and recidivism in Florida. It is important to note that one 
would expect to see juvenile commitments decline as the rates of juvenile crime and 
seriousness of offenses decline.  
 
Juvenile Population Ages 10-17 
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 The number of juveniles in the general population, ages 10-17 in Florida has 
increased by 11% between FY 1997-98 and FY 2001-02 (Florida Department of Juvenile 
Justice, Outcome Evaluation, 2003). 
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Rate of Referrals to DJJ Per 1000 
Youth Age 10-17 by Fiscal Year 
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 During the same time period, there has been a 22% decrease in the rate of juvenile 
crime per 1,000 youth ages 10-17 from 112 in 1997-98 to 87 in 2001-02. Compared to 10 
years ago, the rate of juvenile crime per 1,000 youth has decreased almost 30% (Florida 
Department of Juvenile Justice, Long Range Program Plan, 2003). 
Delinquency Referrals Statewide 
5-Year Overall Trend 
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In addition to the decline in rates of referrals in Florida’s juvenile justice system, 
there is also a decline in seriousness of offenses. For example, since FY 1997-98, felony 
offenses have declined by 17%, and misdemeanor offenses have declined by 15%. However, 
“other offenses,” which include violations of probation, have been increasing since 1998-99 
(DJJ Outcome Evaluation, 2003). The Department of Juvenile Justice has noted an increase 
of more than 50% in the number of youth who violate probation or aftercare and are placed 
back into residential programs between FY 2001-02 and FY 2002-03 (Florida Department of 
Juvenile Justice, Long Range Program Plan, 2003). 
 
Admissions to Secure Detention 
FY 1999-2003 
 
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1999-
2000
2000-
2001
2001-
2002
2002-
2003
Total Admissions to
Secure Detention
 
 
Although there was a slight decrease in the number of admissions to secure detention, 
the number of admissions has remained over 50,000 each year. OJJDP reports that the rate of 
detention of youth in Florida is 25% greater than the national average (Sickmund & Snyder, 
1999).  
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Delinquency Commitments Statewide: 
By Program/Risk Level 
FY 1998-99 to 2002-03 
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In FY 2002-03 there were 10,151 total admissions into DJJ commitment programs 
(DJJ admissions data collected on September 12, 2003). Over the last five years, there has 
been about a 4% increase in residential commitments. Five-year trends for commitments to 
residential programs show that moderate-risk programs consistently have the highest number 
of admissions compared to other levels. Residential capacity within the department has 
increased 30% over the last five years from 5,579 beds in 1999 to 7,256 beds in 2003 
(Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Long Range Program Plan, 2003). 
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Recidivism* Trends for Youth Completing  
Residential Commitment Programs 
FY 1996-2001 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01
Percent of Total
Referrals
Percent of Felony
Referrals 
 
 
*Recidivism is defined as a subsequent arrest/referral to DJJ within one year of completion 
of a residential program. The total percent of referrals has slightly declined from 65% in FY 1996-
97 to 60% in FY 2000-01, while the percent of subsequent referrals for felony offenses has 
remained relatively the same at about 45%. (Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Outcome 
Evaluation, 2003).  
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IV. Research Questions 
 
 There has been a series of published reviews raising concerns about the policies and 
practices of DJJ. OPPAGA has played a major leadership role in closely examining the 
Florida juvenile justice system. NCCD has relied heavily on the OPPAGA reports and 
supplemented these with additional data.  
On a systemic basis are the programs operated by DJJ informed by the 
best research?  
NO. Florida is making modest progress, but much more needs to be done. 
 
When looking at the programs operated by the DJJ and whether they are informed by the 
best research, OPPAGA has found that:  
• Many times, changes or decisions to discontinue programs were not based on a 
systematic planning and decision making approach. Planning is ad hoc and in 
response to the budget (Report No. 02-17). 
• The Department does not design programs that replicate what research has shown to 
be effective (Report No. 02-17). 
• The state has not conducted randomized designs or rigorous testing to determine true 
effectiveness of the programs it supports. 
• The Quality Assurance (QA) system by which programs are rated by DJJ has little 
correlation with reduction of recidivism as a program outcome (Report No. 03-73). 
• There is no tool for assessing cost and effectiveness of community-based programs 
(Report No. 02-17).  
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• While the Department has used national research models like Communities that Care and 
the 8% Solution to develop delinquency prevention policies, it can benefit from using 
additional research to assess results of their strategies and also to identify ways to refine 
their programs (Report No. 02-62). Additionally, not all the important features of these 
models have been incorporated. For example, The Intensive Delinquency Diversion 
Services (IDDS), modeled after California’s successful 8% Solution, is different from the 
model in that it does not have the entire service response (daily, comprehensive day 
treatment program for 18 months), and it also is used as a program to divert youth from 
the juvenile justice system instead of to serve youth who are on probation status.  
• There are only four Multisystemic Therapy (MST) contracts in the state and none of the 
other type of multiple approach intervention programming that addresses family, school, 
and community issues, and that has higher levels of treatment intensity and duration, and 
more structure (Report No. 02-17). 
 
 On the issue of using research to inform program development, OPPAGA has 
recommended that:  
• DJJ “use a systematic, research-based approach to initiating and discontinuing programs” 
(Report No. 02-17) in order to improve its community supervision programs. Community 
supervision programs are the most common disposition; in 2000, 79% of youth that were 
handled judicially went to community supervision programs.  
• Apply research findings on risk factors and successful prevention programs when 
selecting and funding delinquency prevention programs (Report No. 02-62).  
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• Because only one-third of projects address the family risk category, consider funding 
more activities and programs that include family participation and that serve younger 
children (Report No. 02-62). 
  
 NCCD and others have conducted research to show what kinds of programs are most 
effective for different types of youthful offenders. Effective programming such as Multisystemic 
Therapy, Family Functional Therapy, Wraparound Milwaukee, and other well-structured 
community-based programs continue to produce significant benefits for at-risk youths, their 
families and for taxpayers. Rather than designing research-based programs and requesting budget 
support, many programs in Florida are developed in response to ongoing budget situations. 
Research-proven programs that can be more cost-effective than many current approaches are 
discussed in the recommendations section. 
Currently, DJJ is trying to implement a research-based approach for selecting programs 
for a solid continuum of care, but the agency has to move further in this direction. For example, 
the DJJ’s research on Program Accountability Measures (PAM) scores, and other descriptive 
program data can be an important tool for policy makers. It is NCCD’s view that DJJ possesses a 
sophisticated research capacity and potential, but this capacity is not being fully utilized for 
program planning or to improve operations. Although the state of Florida does have programs 
that have proven effective through rigorous national research studies, such as drug courts, multi-
systemic treatment programs, and wraparound services, there needs to be more rather than less of 
these programs available to the juvenile court. Sentencing options that are responsive to public 
safety concerns and youth needs should be available for judges. Programs such as Associated 
Marine Institutes, Youth Advocacy Programs (YAP) and high quality gender-specific 
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programming such as PACE Center for Girls, are promising programs that have been evaluated 
and that incorporate a variety of characteristics of effective programs. These include: continuous 
case management; emphasis on reintegration and reentry services; opportunities for youth 
achievement and involvement in program decision-making; clear and consistent consequences 
for misconduct, enriched educational and vocational programming; and, a variety of forms of 
individual, group, and family counseling matched to youth’s needs (Altschuler & Armstrong, 
1984). Among programs for institutionalized offenders, program characteristics found to be 
strongly related to positive intervention effects were the duration and intensity of service 
provided and the quality of service delivery, program age (2 or more years old), administration 
of treatment by mental health personnel, and the specific type of treatment (Lipsey & Wilson, 
1998).  
 In general, we found that research-tested, home-based services such as wraparound 
programs are underutilized in Florida. Because OPPAGA has found little correlation between 
quality assurance ratings and program outcomes, resources could be better used on research-
based and data-driven approaches to measure program effectiveness. Such evaluations and 
planning to operate many research-based programs could have a great impact on youth in the 
Florida juvenile justice system. Improvements in the effectiveness of residential treatment can be 
modeled after Missouri’s smaller correctional facilities. Over the last 20 years, Missouri’s 
Division of Youth Services (DYS) has operated small sites across the state that house fewer than 
36 youth in each, providing a positive, treatment-oriented approach that is not punitive or prison-
like. Compared to other states, Missouri’s approach shows more success in reducing recidivism 
and in protecting the safety of confined youth, preventing abuses, and fostering learning (Annie 
E. Casey Foundation, 2003). Treatment is a part of every aspect of their programs including 
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group processes and personal development. The state invests in staff training (hiring primarily 
college educated “youth specialists” rather than traditional correctional officers), case 
management and family counseling as well as community-based aftercare (Annie E. Casey 
Foundation, 2003). 
 Because of statute language changes by the Florida Legislature in 2000, all commitments 
are for residential placement. Thus, the option for judges to place youth in minimum-risk 
nonresidential programs (Level 2) as part of the first of five restrictiveness levels within the 
placement continuum were eliminated (FS 985.03-(45)(a). Level 2 programs offered community 
based services to both committed and non-committed youth. Success rates for youth completing 
non-residential programs were high and these types of programs, which included day treatment 
and special intensive groups can be very cost effective. Additionally, there does not appear to be 
a strong aftercare component within the continuum for the most serious, chronic offenders. DJJ 
continues to fund boot camps, and although PAM scores show considerably lower recidivism 
rates in Florida than other states using boot camps, research has shown shock strategies to be 
ineffective. Furthermore, DJJ continues to contract with programs that have little research to 
support their efficacy. 
The new DJJ “What Works Initiative” is a step towards introducing research-tested 
assessment, intervention, treatment, and management practices that have proven their worth 
across the nation. Evaluation of such pilots and statewide replication of national research-tested 
program models should be accelerated. A workgroup has been established to develop a juvenile 
placement classification instrument, but the validation of this tool is unknown. DJJ has recently 
issued an RFP to implement a validated risk assessment system for youths on probation. These 
steps are encouraging and need more focus and support from top DJJ leadership. 
  22
 
Does Florida make the best use of its fiscal resources to provide for public 
protection and the treatment of troubled youths?  
 
NO.  
 
With regards to Florida making the best use of its fiscal resources, OPPAGA has found the 
following: 
• Although the Department has improved its prevention programs in order to direct 
resources to high-risk youth and measure program effectiveness, significant problems 
still remain (Report No. 02-62).  
• According to DJJ, a 1% reduction in juvenile recidivism can save $16.4 million over a 5-
year period (Report No. 02-62). 
• Use of a consequence bed or other alternative instead of placing youth who violate 
probation in residential programs is less costly, more efficient, and serves as an 
intermediate sanction available to judges (Report No. 02-17). 
• Appropriateness of residential placements by the department was questioned at a time 
when judicial commitments to the department increased and referrals to court decreased. 
Therefore, OPPAGA examined the delinquency histories of youth committed for 
misdemeanor offenses and non-law violations of probation (Report No. 01-49). 
Appropriate sanctions for youth with intermediate delinquency histories are in question 
(Report No. 01-49). Today, 40% of youth committed to residential facilities are 
committed for misdemeanor offenses and non-law violations of probation (Report No. 
03-76). 
• Bed vacancy rates and utilization show that there is a high demand for special needs 
treatment services. Because more moderate-risk and high-risk programs have treatment 
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resources, many youth are placed in residential programs to meet their treatment needs 
(Report No. 03-74). 
• Eighty-seven percent of residential programs are contracted to and operated by for-profit 
or nonprofit organizations (Report No. 03-73). 
• Security measures and treatment services within the residential levels are unclear and 
sometimes overlap. Additionally, there may be differences in the levels assigned by 
judges with youth whose criminal histories may be similar. Daily rates to contracted 
programs differ (Report No. 96-48).  
 
 In addition, the Florida Corrections Commission (2001) conducted a review of the 
organizational and management structure of DJJ for the purpose of recommending improvements 
in administrative efficiency to achieve savings. OPPAGA further recommended the following: 
 
• The Department of Juvenile Justice should create an alternative (i.e., tune-up program, 
consequence units, etc.) to placing youth in costly residential programs for violation of 
community control (Report No. 98-75; 96-48). OPPAGA estimated that creation and 
utilization of consequence units or an intensive tune-up program, where youth spend two 
weeks instead of six months in a commitment program, could save the state 
approximately $6 million per year. The legislature appropriated $3 million for 60 beds in 
FY 1999-00 and $7.4 million for 96 beds in FY 2000-01. Rather than using the beds for 
their intended “consequence” unit for probation violators, the beds were used for 
detention center overflow. 
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• The Department is not currently operating consequence units, and implementation has 
indefinitely been postponed due to budget shortfalls (Report No. 02-17 ) 
• In their latest report, OPPAGA endorsed the treatment concept of diverting non-law 
violators of probation into a Re-direction Program without detention. DJJ proposes a Re-
direction Program that begins with a 45-day detention. OPPAGA recommends a study for 
cost savings of the MST or FFT treatment without detention proposed by DJJ and 
recommended that the Department initiate 2 pilot studies. OPPAGA estimates that the 
Department could save an additional $1 million and achieve comparable results (Report 
No. 03-76).  
• In order to maximize use of state funds, the department should reduce residential 
commitment programs beds in areas where there is a high vacancy rate (Report No. 03-
74).  
• Use a risk-based approach to improve program monitoring or contract management of 
programs, thus reducing the number of monitoring visits to providers who are not likely 
to have performance problems (Report No. 03-73). 
• Reconfiguring the level structure of residential commitments, either by better 
differentiating between the levels or by arranging the system in two tiers that are more 
consistent with the characteristics of committed youth, could reduce program costs, and 
be more efficient when placing youth (Report No. 98-75). 
 
 The good news is that juvenile crime in Florida has declined, but the bad news is that 
juvenile justice system spending has increased. The increased use of confinement is an expensive 
way to lower crime rates. Graduated sanctions and research-based programs can be a more 
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efficient use of taxpayer dollars, while providing for public safety and treating troubled youth. 
Effective use of good risk assessments achieve cost-effectiveness in that they help juvenile 
justice resources to be directed towards higher-risk youth (Aos, 2002). While the department has 
a supervision and risk classification instrument (SRCI) as well as a placement matrix, these are 
not used to examine the fit between youth and their placements. Use of a disposition chart that 
sets out graduated treatment options, where the first level is community disposition, the second 
level is intermediate disposition, and the third level is commitment to the juvenile justice 
department, as is the case in North Carolina, can help lead to more appropriate placement. The 
validity of Florida’s risk instrument is still under question. There is no system that effectively 
matches the control and supervision needs of youth with the residential programs Florida is 
funding. Furthermore, the department does not use a state-of-the-art forecasting method to 
determine future bed or program needs. As a consequence, DJJ reacts to what beds or 
community treatment slots are available. Specialized programming for youth who violate 
probation is not available and thus resources for detention and commitment are inappropriately 
used. Ad hoc decisions to defund successful programs, remove day treatment as a front-end 
alternative, and use moderate-risk programs for low-risk youths (because of the absence of 
treatment in the low-risk programs) are not cost-effective strategies and appear to fail to 
understand systemic consequences.  
 
To what extent are DJJ's program and policy priorities responsive to the 
needs expressed by policy makers and professionals at the community 
level? 
 
In looking at whether DJJ’s program and policy priorities are responsive to the needs 
expressed by policy makers and professionals at the community level, NCCD went back to 
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the Comprehensive Strategy implementation effort in Florida. In the late 1990s, NCCD and 
Developmental Research and Programs, Inc. (DRP), with support from OJJDP and DJJ, 
interacted with six communities and hundreds of local stakeholders in Florida to assess the 
gaps in services. The stakeholders included local law enforcement officials, judges, school 
leaders, community-based organizations, city and county officials, and private 
philanthropies. The communities included Lee County, Miami-Dade County, Volusia 
County, Leon County, St. Lucie County, and Duval County. To begin with, the sites’ 
preeminent interest was in prevention. All six sites called for services such as:  
 
• Development of a validated, reliable risk measurement, valid, structured decision 
making tools 
• Transitional/Independent Living 
• Aftercare 
• Management information system (MIS) that is integrated and can track outcomes 
• Drug Court 
• Sex Offender Programs 
• Community Assessment Centers 
• Programs that empower families 
• Targeted prevention and early intervention efforts, pre-arrest diversion services 
• Enhancement of juvenile education services 
• Implemented restorative justice and victim services 
• Community alternatives for arrested youth with mental health and substance abuse 
problems 
• Expansion of Family Preservation Program and Family Builders Program 
• Mobile crisis counseling intervention 
• Increased specialty beds 
• Resource directories for treatment and referral services 
 
Floridians across the state called for early prevention and treatment and supported its 
importance at a time when significant cuts to prevention programs were proposed across the 
state. Additionally, a statewide juvenile crime poll conducted by the Children’s Campaign in 
2001 revealed that frequent voters in Florida (n=608) support prevention and treatment programs 
that will reduce juvenile crime and save money spent on incarceration in the future. Eighty-five 
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percent of those surveyed believe that state funding for prevention and intervention programs 
should not be cut. More than 75% of those surveyed said they would rather have more 
prevention and treatment programs than pay lower state and local taxes if given the choice. 
Eighty-nine percent agreed that juvenile crime could be greatly reduced if elected officials 
expanded prevention efforts such as after-school programs and early childhood education. These 
polling results show a public that believes in a balanced approach to fighting juvenile crime and 
not one that is merely punitive.  
Although the state was funding some excellent non-residential programs, communities 
were calling for even more of these types of programs and more successful diversion options, but 
were getting fewer. Before the Juvenile Justice Advisory Board (JJAB) was defunded, their 
Prevention Outcome Evaluation report noted that DJJ did not have an overarching, unified 
approach to delinquency prevention activities. Funds allocated to prevention as a percentage of 
the total allocated to DJJ are approximately 10%, and have remained consistent over the past 3 
years (Report No. 02-62). Operating residential programming is approximately half of DJJ’s 
$633 million budget. One of the recommendations from OPPAGA’s program evaluation of the 
Prevention and Victim Services Program of DJJ was to “hold quarterly meetings with other state 
agencies involved in prevention activities to share information and coordinate state prevention 
policy (Report No. 02-62; p. 26).”  
Today, ten years after the state planned for the 1994 Juvenile Justice Reforms, and in 
addition to the community planning and campaign polls, NCCD contacted a cross-section of 
approximately 20 professionals working closely with the system to add more 
qualitative/anecdotal information to the discussion of local needs. NCCD talked with several 
people including judges, public defenders, law enforcement, juvenile justice personnel, and child 
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advocates around the state who were interested in sharing their thoughts on juvenile justice in 
Florida. Specifically, NCCD wanted to inventory the types of services and program gaps. 
Additionally, NCCD wanted input on the types of policies and programs that, if instituted, would 
give Florida a better system of graduated sanctions. The following is a synthesis of some of their 
responses. 
 When asked about the gaps in services that exist and the types of new programs that are 
needed, responses ranged from specialized services for youth to wraparound, intensive services 
that include the entire family. At the individual level, mental health services, programs for girls, 
programs for younger youth, programs for runaway and incorrigible youth, continuum for sex 
offenders, and minority youth services were among the most popular responses. The overall 
consensus is that good risk and needs instruments can help guide appropriate placements so that 
youth may receive the services they need.  
 A public defender from the northern part of the state noted that younger youth are 
entering the system and that there are no services designed for them, nor are there many 
commitment programs available for girls. Additionally, there is a need for outpatient sex 
offender programs for low-level offenders who do not require residential care and a need to keep 
smaller, proven prevention programs. A law enforcement officer in the northern part of the state 
relayed the need for diversion programs for smaller counties with fewer resources. A law 
enforcement officer representing South Florida relayed that judges can make choices when more 
treatment options are available. This may include the re-establishment of community-based, non-
residential programs as options available to judges.  
 At the system level, the need for trained, quality staff; proper assessment and 
identification of need for appropriate placement; education and support for youth offenders with 
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children, programs that are closer to home so that family can visit, life skills curriculum, and 
aftercare services were among the most frequent responses from the people with whom we 
talked. One respondent divided the system into levels and said that youth cannot move freely 
within the continuum of services and that, if the system were set up with a master plan for 
graduated sanctions where youth could move through the continuum based on their needs, staff 
could make better placement decisions. If the goal were to reduce residential placement or to 
develop alternative placements, then the system and its partners could plan better. One 
representative of boards and councils emphasized the importance of input from youth, parents, 
and the community when making policy decisions.  
 When asked about policies that could better serve youth, recommendations ranged from 
funding priorities to specific policy changes. Representatives from local communities are 
expressing that, in order for youth to be better served, funding priorities need to shift, new 
programs need to be instituted, and specific policy changes need to occur. The chart below 
groups the types of funding areas, programming, and policy areas that were commonly 
recommended to meet the needs of youth in Florida.  
 Florida used to have a vibrant network of local boards and councils that advised the 
DJJ about their needs. Florida statute 985.4135 established juvenile justice circuit boards and 
county councils in each of the 20 judicial circuits and in each of the 67 counties to provide 
advice and direction to the department regarding development and implementation of 
juvenile programs. It does not appear that much of the local input and comprehensive 
planning is incorporated in current DJJ policies and programming.  
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Funding Programs Policies 
Integrate systems: child welfare 
(dependency/delinquency), 
schools.  
Age-appropriate diversion 
programs for younger offenders. 
Mandate better tools: increased, 
in-depth assessment of youth 
and treatment needs. 
Put more money into prevention 
programs. 
Aftercare programs that are 
effective. 
Appropriate placement for 
youth. 
Put more money into alternatives to 
detention. 
Promote holistic services that 
look at the family and emphasize 
treatment over punishment.  
Clearly defined procedures for 
moving youth up a level of 
commitment for violations. 
Funding for CINS/FINS process. Prevention programs. Expand eligibility for diversion. 
Collaboration between DJJ Law 
enforcement, and the courts. 
Make programs smaller and less 
institutionalized. 
Sensitivity and cultural training 
of detention staff. 
 Interventions that are evidence-
based. 
Reduce caseloads of juvenile 
probation officers (JPO’s). 
 Place case managers in schools 
with highest number of 
offenders. 
Equity in the referral process 
across the state. 
 
 Other states have moved toward a localized delivery of services, particularly for 
prevention. Examples include Ohio, Texas, and California. A funding initiative in response to 
the growing need for local alternatives and overcrowded institutions called “RECLAIM 
Ohio” (Reasoned and Equitable Community and Local Alternatives to the Incarceration of 
Minors) encourages juvenile courts to divert youth from the Ohio Department of Youth 
Services (DYS) institutions and corrections facilities. As a result, more youth are served 
locally (between 36% and 42% reduction in state commitments), and families are better able 
to participate in the treatment of their sons and daughters. Recidivism among RECLAIM 
youth has remained low (Latessa et al., 1998). Additionally, the Ohio DYS can focus 
treatment on the youth who are repeat offender, serious, or felony-level. Juvenile Courts 
receive an allocation from DYS to develop or purchase a range of community-based options 
to treat youthful offenders and at-risk youth. Early in the initiative, the state deducted from 
total county allocations a certain amount for each youth sent to an institution or community 
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corrections facility. Today, allocations are based on a four-year average of felony 
adjudications and deductions for bed usage from the previous year (Latessa et al., 1998). 
 In North Carolina, the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1998, based on OJJDP’s 
Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders, was enacted 
as the most comprehensive reform in the state’s juvenile justice system in twenty years. 
Juvenile Crime Prevention Councils were created to develop and implement comprehensive 
prevention and intervention programs. These were based on assessment of risk factors for 
youth in the community and resources available in each of their respective counties. The state 
has seen a 52% decrease in the number of annual commitments to youth development centers 
since 1998 (North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
2001). 
 Wayne County, Michigan, the state’s most populated county, where more than half of 
the adjudicated delinquents of the state reside, responded by creating a system of care in their 
Department of Community Justice to effectively reduce and prevent juvenile crime. Care 
management organizations are implemented with a goal to create a “virtual wraparound 
program where everyone involved in a child’s life: parents, teachers, caseworkers, the court, 
can keep each other apprised of the child’s progress toward achieving the goals set out in 
their case plan” have helped to reduce the use of secure detention and out-of-home 
placements during the two years the program has been implemented. Additionally, as a result 
of the care management process, a drop in drug use and recidivism has also been noted 
(Wayne County Department of Community Justice, 2002). 
 In California, the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA) created a stable 
funding source available to counties for collaborative efforts and programs aimed at 
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addressing and curbing crime and delinquency among at-risk youth. Programs must be based 
on approaches that have proven effective and must respond to the identified needs of each 
county. Additionally, programs are required to address a continuum of responses for at-risk 
youth and juvenile offenders including prevention, intervention, supervision, treatment, and 
incarceration. Preliminary results indicate that these programs are making a positive 
quantitative difference on at-risk youth on their statutorily mandated outcomes (arrest rates, 
incarceration rates, completion of probation rates, probation violation rates, completion of 
restitution, and completion of community service) as well as various program outcomes such 
as school attendance, improved academic performance, and decreased drug usage (California 
Board of Corrections, 2003). 
 Alternative philosophies in states that support their local communities with resources 
to provide prevention and early intervention and treatment services for youth are showing 
reductions in the numbers of youth being sent to state residential programs. In addition to 
financial support for communities and increased participation in the comprehensive planning 
process by the communities, youth are served closer to home and are offered treatment in the 
least restrictive environment. NCCD research supports comprehensive strategies and the 
responsibility of states to remain the fiscal agents for local community programming. As the 
fiscal agent, DJJ can plan ways to channel more resources at the local level and leave more 
discretion for programming to judges and community officials. 
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V. Other Concerns 
 
Detention in Florida 
 The following section discusses issues that have not been fully addressed by 
OPPAGA, but which NCCD would like to put on the table. These issues include the overuse 
of detention, girls in juvenile justice programs, and disproportionate minority representation 
in juvenile correctional facilities. 
 Like many other states, Florida faces crowded and costly detention facilities. 
In Florida, there were 51,774 admissions and 7,779 transfers to secure detention centers in 
FY 2001-02 (Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Outcome Evaluation, 2003). There was 
a 77 % growth in the number of admissions to secure detention between FY 1991-92 and FY 
1996-97 (www.djj.state.fl.us/detention). Much of this growth can be attributed to an 
expansion of detainable offenses through changes in statues.  
Juvenile detention is a short-term program for youth who are awaiting court 
proceedings and also for youth who are awaiting placement into a program. A standardized 
detention risk instrument is used to screen youth who are a risk to public safety and to 
determine if detention care is warranted—whether the child should be placed into secure, 
nonsecure, or home detention care (FS. 985.13 (2)(b)2). In secure detention, youth are held in 
a secure, jail-like facility operated by DJJ. There are currently 25 centers across the state. The 
use of secure detention is based on finding that 1) youth present a substantial risk of not 
appearing at a hearing, 2) there exists a significant risk of the youth inflicting bodily harm to 
others as evidenced by recent behavior, history of committing a property offense prior to 
adjudication, disposition, or placement, or 3) the youth committed contempt of court, and 
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there are requests for protection from imminent bodily harm (Florida Department of Juvenile 
Justice, Outcome Evaluation, 2003; 29). Non-secure detention involves temporary custody of 
youth in a community-based residential home that is contracted with the department. There is 
virtually no funding for this type of alternative, and therefore it is not a real option, though 
authorized in statute. Home detention care is used for youth who can be released to a 
physically non-restrictive environment such as their home, usually to a parent or guardian. 
Funding for this type of alternative was also eliminated. For youth who are on electronic 
monitoring, home detention is still used. Additionally, the statute also recommends that DJJ 
shall continue to identify alternatives to secure detention care and shall develop such 
alternatives and annually submit them to the Legislature for authorization and appropriation 
FS 985.214 (4)(b)4.  
There have been several recent crises in Florida detention. In Miami, a 17-year old 
youth, Omar Paisley, died when his appendix burst, after being sprawled on the floor of his 
Miami-Dade detention cell and crying of pain for three days. In the Tampa area, a fatal fight 
between two inmates at the Pinellas Juvenile Detention Center left Danny Matthews dead. 
Parents are sharing their personal stories about the lack of appropriate supervision and 
treatment of children in detention centers. In response to this, the Florida House of 
Representatives formed a Select Committee on Juvenile Detention Facilities. The Select 
Committee will continue to investigate the death of Omar Paisley, but also will investigate 
the conditions that exist in other state facilities across Florida and seek ways to prevent other 
abuses. As a result, these problems have led to more questions about the operations of DJJ 
and what could be done to improve detention. These include:  
  35
 1) What alternatives to detention remain for local law enforcement, state attorneys 
and judges, allowing the public safety to be served by placing children in the least restrictive 
environment? What should be reinstated? 
 2) What needs to be done to redirect DJJ to provide the services most needed locally, 
by the people on the “front lines”?  
 3) Do existing policies ensure that the right children are getting the right help at the 
right time?  
 According to DJJ, reductions in detention may be attributed to the increase in the 
number of residential beds, leaving less wait time for program placement, in addition to the 
fact that length of stays in residential programs have increased, thus shortening the period 
youth can cycle back through the system (detention) again. With regards to detention, 
OPPAGA has found that: 
• The department has not identified and implemented critical post staffing patterns for 
each secure detention facility, as recommended in 2000, in order to reduce problems 
such as high turnover, high overtime, outdated staffing patterns, and high training 
costs (Report No. 02-47). 
• High turnover of staff as compared to other state personnel exists: 26% of detention 
care workers compared with the statewide separation of 13% (Report No. 02-47). 
  
 However, there has not been a thorough study done to show the impact of elimination 
of home detention as an alternative to costly, secure detention in Florida. 
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 This section uses detention data from OJJDP’s Juveniles in Residential Placement 
1999, for which there is demographic data available for Florida (Sickmund & Wan, 2001). 
DJJ will be publishing demographic data regarding youth in detention in the coming month.  
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 Most youth held in secure detention were referred for person offenses (n=474) 
followed by property offenses (n=459). Of note, there were 318 youth detained for technical 
violations in 1999 (Sickmund & Wan, 2001).  
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 Similar to trends for commitment, there were more males detained (n = 1209) 
compared to females (n = 276). There were more black youth detained (n = 798) than White 
and “Other” youth combined (n = 690). 
The Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, funded by the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation, to establish more effective and efficient systems in juvenile detention across 
jurisdictions, was inspired by a successful pilot endeavor in Broward County, Florida. It is 
part of the initiative to safely minimize populations in juvenile correctional programs through 
policies and practices that are fair and better informed, as well as through community-based 
alternatives that are effective. Four objectives of the JDAI initiative were 1) to eliminate the 
inappropriate or unnecessary use of secure detention, 2) to minimize the failures to appear 
and incidence of delinquent behavior, 3) to redirect public finances from building new 
facility capacity to responsible alternative strategies, and 4) to improve conditions in secure 
detention facilities (Bishop & Griset, 1999). Without affecting public safety or rates of court 
appearance, Broward County was able to change its detention operation. Broward County 
successfully collaborated with agencies and used data-driven polices and programs to reduce 
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the number of youth in secure detention in the late 1980’s and created and used new 
alternatives to detention as well as others which had been underutilized at an unprecedented 
level. Additionally, these changes brought about substantial cost savings.  
The Annie E. Casey Foundation built upon the early successes in Broward County 
and launched a national demonstration project based on the Broward experience. The JDAI 
demonstration produced impressive results in Cook County, IL, Multnomah County, OR, and 
Santa Cruz, CA. The national evaluation showed that detention admissions could be safely 
reduced, and that detention crowding could be eliminated. The JDAI sites also demonstrated 
an impressive ability to improve the conditions of confinement for the remaining youths who 
were still placed in secure detention and to reduce the disproportionate detention of minority 
children (Krisberg, Noya, Jones, & Wallen, 2001). The NCCD evaluation proved that these 
detention reforms did not result in any measurable increase in juvenile crime or in failures to 
appear for court hearings. 
While the communities mentioned above produced the most dramatic and sustained 
results, the JDAI model also showed early progress and positive results in New York City 
and Sacramento, CA. In these latter communities, new elected officials did not embrace the 
JDAI reforms, and the initial progress was reversed. Effective detention reform requires a 
durable consensus among the elected officials and the top juvenile justice professionals. The 
JDAI showed that the technology of reforming secure detention is well known; the question 
is whether the political will exists to implement this technology. The Casey Foundation is 
now working in dozens of jurisdictions to replicate the JDAI model. Interestingly, the Casey 
Foundation attempted to stimulate a statewide replication of the Broward experience in the 
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late 1990s, but these efforts did not meet the expectations of the Casey Foundation or the 
local reformers (Bishop & Griset., 1999). 
The JDAI experience, which is well documented in a series of specialized replication 
manuals produced by the Casey Foundation, reveals that a detention system should contain a 
continuum of home-based care and community-based alternatives that offer various degrees 
of supervision and treatment services matched to the risks and needs of individual young 
people. Youths can be moved to more or less restrictive settings as a function of their 
behavior in the alternative setting. There should also be a structured decision making tool in 
place that guides the decisions for frequency of contact, intensity of supervision, and 
placement needs. The continuum should include home confinement or community 
supervision, day or evening reporting centers, and non-secure shelters that provide 24-hour 
supervision. Additionally, like effective graduated sanctions programming, detention 
alternatives should be staffed by people who can best relate to youth, located close to home, 
and should consider the special needs of their clients. 
Florida currently spends nearly $106 million per year for secure detention (Florida 
Department of Juvenile Justice, QA, 2002). The governor’s budget has recommended that 
local counties could pick up the fiscal responsibility of secure detention services for youth 
awaiting judicial disposition. Although NCCD believes that localized programming is 
beneficial, it does not support a change in fiscal agent, but rather getting more resources into 
the hands of professionals at the local levels. Data on the characteristics of detained youth 
suggest that there might be a substantial number of young people who could be better 
handled in less restrictive and less costly programs. While the issue of short-term secure 
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detention deserves a separate and in-depth analysis, it seems clear that Florida could realize 
substantial cost savings without threatening crucial public safety and child protection goals. 
Growing number of girls in the system.  
  
 A report entitled Educate or Incarcerate by NCCD on girls in the Florida and Duval 
County juvenile justice systems in 2000 profiled the girls in the system and identified 
specific risk factors leading to girls’ continued offending. Between 1993 and 1998, crime 
committed by young women increased by 30% statewide, and NCCD found that girls in 
Duval County were increasingly likely to be detained for minor, nonviolent offenses (Acoca, 
2000). The chart below shows delinquency commitments by gender.  
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Although the number of boys in the Florida juvenile justice system is significantly 
greater than the number of girls, the number of young women who are committed to 
residential programs is steadily increasing, while commitments for males have been more 
stable. During the last five years, commitments for females have increased 25.2% from 1,200 
to 1,604. By contrast, male commitments increased 7.6%, from 6,815 to 7,379 during the 
same time period (Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Fact Sheets, 2003). This growing 
proportion is of concern, because the rates for juvenile crime for girls have dropped by over 
7% during this same period.  
 Together with the PACE Center, NCCD developed a research-based legislative and 
program-related blueprint to effectively combat risk factors and halt the surge of girls 
entering the Florida juvenile justice system. Voices from many Florida communities are 
calling for more options to deal with delinquent girls. Many community-based service 
providers have stepped up to develop increased services for at-risk young women. Yet, 
successive state budgets have witnessed proposals to cut back on services for young women. 
Fortunately, most of the worst budget reductions were averted. But, it is important to note 
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that community-based resources for at-risk women need to be expanded. Averting savage 
budget cuts is not enough. Florida possesses the blueprint of what is needed to better prevent 
and respond to illegal conduct by young women. The state is blessed with the most 
outstanding service providers for girls in the nation. The imperative now is to find the budget 
resources to fully fund the blueprint. 
 
DMC: Growing number of minority youth in the system 
  
 Minority youth are overrepresented at all levels in the juvenile justice system in 
Florida. While minority youth are only about 23 % of the population of children ages 10-17, 
they compose 40 % of the children who are under the control of the juvenile justice system. 
This percentage tends to increase as the level of control by the system increases. For 
example, minority youth constitute 37% of the youth who are referred for delinquency 
(arrested); 46% of the youth who are committed (incarcerated); and, 57% of the children who 
are transferred to adult court (tried as adults). The chart below shows the overrepresentation 
of minority youth at various stages of the juvenile justice system.  
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Minority Overrepresentation at Stages in the Florida Juvenile Justice System 
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  Source: Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, 2002a. 
 
 In 1998, the DJJ initiated the Minority Over-Representation Initiative (MORI) and 
was able to increase its rate of success with minority youth. Evaluation of the MORI projects 
found positive impact at the individual level, that is, only 14% of the youth discharged from 
these programs were re-arrested within one year of discharge, but there was little impact on 
the processing of youth through the system (Nelson, 1999). Nelson recommended that DJJ 
re-examine the juvenile justice continuum and identify the special needs of minority youth. 
Additionally, incorporating the services provided by MORI projects into the prevention, 
diversion, intervention, and aftercare continuum and forming partnerships and collaborations 
with other state agencies as well as community-based organizations were recommended. 
Lastly, Nelson proposed a scientific study that could identify the causes and factors that 
contribute to the disproportionate rates of failure of minority youth served (Nelson, 1999). 
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 Other studies regarding the overrepresentation of minorities in juvenile justice 
systems have recommended the important need for expanding local diversionary options. 
Moreover, implementation of structured decision making models that utilize culturally 
competent assessment tools and training of staff at all levels of the continuum has been 
shown to reduce the over representation of minority youth in secure confinement. 
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VI. Implications of alternative programs and policies 
Simulations 
 
 If we implemented research-based programs that are responsive to local needs, we 
could make better use of current fiscal resources. These monies could be made available to 
enrich prevention services and to increase the budgets of remaining placement programs. 
This would allow for better paid staff and more enriched treatment services. Below are some 
examples that will show the fiscal impact of modest programs and policies. The options 
presented below are based on very conservative estimates, if not underestimates, about the 
proportion of youth that could qualify for alternative programming. It is also a presentation 
of the minimum amount of savings that could be achieved by implementing these example 
options and does not consider bolder options that could increase savings.  
 The basis of all of these simulations is a rudimentary equation that takes the number 
of admissions and multiplies it by the average number of days that each youth spends in 
different kinds of placement. The result is the number of bed days required for the different 
types of admissions. Dividing the number of bed days by 365 yields the number of beds that 
would be needed on an average day. We have also used DJJ cost data to calculate the cost of 
fewer bed days, and we relied mostly on DJJ estimates to add back in the costs needed to 
support enhanced community-based services. 
 The bedspace chart uses information about the number of youth admitted to juvenile 
justice residential programs in the FY 2002-2003. This chart will be used as baseline 
information to guide discussions of alternative program and policy implications.  
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Current Practices 
Bedspace Chart 
 
 Admissions ALOS 
(days) 
Bed 
Days 
ADP Total DJJ 
Exp. 
Exp. 
per day 
Level       
Low 1,590 140 222,600 610 $18,155,222  $81.56 
Moderate 6,110 227 1,386,970 3,800 $118,415,787  $85.38 
High 2,329 336 782,544 2,144 $81,392,073 $104.01 
Maximum 122 595 72,590 199 $15,681,159 $216.02 
   
Totals 10,151 6,753 $233,644,241 $486.97
 
 
Definitions: 
• Admissions: based on the number of youth placed in a commitment program in FY 
2001-2002.  
• ALOS (Average length of stay): is the average number of days for youth to complete 
a program in the distinctive level.  
• Bed days: the average number of days required for availability of a bed, given the 
average length of stay and the number of admissions for a particular level.  
• ADP (Average daily population): the number of bed days divided by 365. This 
number represents the amount of beds needed to maintain the status quo at each level.  
• Total DJJ Expenditures: by each level of residential commitment as reported in the 
2002 Annual DJJ Quality Assurance Report.  
• Expenditures per day: the total expenditures by level divided by the number of bed 
days.  
 
Proposed Options 
 
 NCCD proposes that home-based care programs such as Multisystemic Therapy 
(MST), Functional Family Therapy (FFT), or wraparound services such as Wraparound 
Milwaukee be considered for some youth who are now going into low- or moderate-security 
DJJ residential programs. MST is an intensive, home-based intervention that emphasizes 
treatment and intense contact, and provides services to youth who are chronic, violent, or 
substance abusing offenders in their homes, schools, and communities. The Washington State 
Institute for Public Policy found that taxpayers gain a cost savings averaging $31,661 per 
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participant (Aos et al., 2001). FFT is an empirically-grounded intervention program that 
targets youth between the ages of 11 and 18, while also treating their younger siblings. FFT 
is a short-term intervention with, on average, 8 to 12 one-hour sessions for less severe cases 
and up to 26 to 30 hours of direct service for more difficult situations. Sessions are extended 
over a three-month period. Target populations range from at-risk preadolescents to youth 
with very serious problems such as conduct disorder. The data from numerous outcome 
studies suggest that, when applied as intended, FFT can reduce recidivism between 25% and 
60%. Additional studies suggest that FFT is a cost-effective intervention that can reduce 
treatment costs to a level well below that of traditional services and other family-based 
interventions. The Washington State Institute for Public Policy found that taxpayers gain a 
cost savings average of $14,149 per participant (Aos et al., 2001). 
 Wraparound Milwaukee is a coordinated system of community-based care and 
resources for families of children with severe emotional, behavioral, and mental health needs. 
The wraparound approach is based on identifying what services families really need to care 
for a child with special needs, to identify personal, community, and professional resources to 
meet those needs, and to obtain and “wrap” those services around the child and family.  
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Option 1: Divert youth in low-risk residential programs and some youth in 
moderate-risk residential programs into intensive home-based programs.  
 
 This option assumes that 50% of youth in low-risk residential programs may still 
need residential care, but that the other half (n=795) could safely be diverted into intensive 
home-based care programs for 140 days. The option further assumes that 25% of youth in 
moderate-risk residential programs (n=1527) could be safely diverted into the same type of 
intensive home-based care programs for 240 days. Intensive home-based care programs 
provide youth with effective, research-based, intensive wraparound services that will include 
their families in their homes. A program such as MST is expected to cost approximately 
$3,500 per youth for a 120-day period, or approximately $30 per day. If these proposed youth 
(n=2,322) were to remain in residential programs, the state would currently spend $38.6 
million in providing services at the low-risk and moderate-risk levels. Implementing NCCD’s 
diversion option would cost slightly under $14 million for these youth, while providing 
research-based effective programming, ensuring public safety, and saving $24.7 million. 
Additionally, diverting 50% of youth in low-risk programs and 25% of youth in moderate-
risk programs creates capacity in these programs for the transfer of youth from high- and 
maximum-risk programs into these programs as part of a graduated sanctions process. 
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OPTION 1 
Divert 50% of admissions to low-level residential programs into home-based care 
programs such as MST, FFT, or AMI. Additionally, divert 25% of moderate risk 
admissions into the same home-based care programs.  
 
 Admissions ALOS 
(days) 
Bed 
Days 
ADP Cost  
(In Millions) 
Low Risk (Current 
Cost) 1,590 140 222,600 610 
$18.1 
Keep in low-risk 
residential (50%) 795 140 111,300 305 
$9.1 
50% Alternative 
diversion 795 140 111,300 305 
$3.2 
Proposed Cost    $12.3 
Bed day savings    $5.8 
   
Moderate Risk 
(Current Total)  6,110 227 1,386,970 3,800 
$118.4 
Keep in moderate 
risk residential 
(75%) 4,583 227 1,040,341 2,850 
$88.8 
25% baseline 
services 1527 227 346,629 950 $29.6 
25% Alternative 
diversion 1527 240 366,480 1004 
 
$10.7 
Proposed Cost    $99.5 
Bed day savings    $18.9 
      
Total cost 
savings  
 $24.7 
 
Option 2: Reducing length of incarceration and Increasing intensive, home-based 
aftercare 
 
 This option assumes that the length of stay for 50% for the remaining youth 
(n=2,291) in moderate-risk residential programs could be reduced. That is, these youth could 
remain in residential facilities for a reduced period equal to 120 days and then receive home-
based care services such as MST, FFT, or AMI for an additional 120 days. Currently, the 
average length of stay for a moderate-risk program is 227 days. This alternative would 
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reduce the amount of time a youth is in a residential facility, but at the same time, it would 
increase the total time a youth and family receive services (n=240 days). This alternative 
sentence that combines residential care and wraparound services would cost approximately 
$31.5 million, compared to approximately $44.4 million that the state would spend to keep 
these same youth in residential care for an average of 227 days, a cost savings of $12.9 
million. 
OPTION 2 
 
Reducing length of incarceration and increasing intensive, home-based aftercare 
 
 Admissions ALOS 
(days) 
Bed 
Days 
ADP Cost  
(In Millions) 
Remaining moderate-
risk (baseline) 4,583 227 1,040,341 2,850 $88.8
50% baseline services 
(reg LOS) 2,291 227 520,057 1,425 $44.4
Combined alternative 
sentence total (50%) 2,291 240 549,840 1,506 $31.5
     
Total Cost savings  $12.9
 
 
 
Option 3: Slightly reduced length of stays for a small proportion of youth in high risk 
and maximum-risk facilities coupled with intensive aftercare services. 
 
 
 This option assumes a 90-day reduction in length of stay for only 20% of the youth 
sent to maximum-risk (n=24) and high-risk programs (n=465) coupled with intensive, 
aftercare services for an additional 90 days. These youths require placement in a secure 
facility, however, the average length of stay in maximum-risk facilities in Florida is 595 
days, greater than the average in many other states. This alternative would just reduce the 
length of stay for some youths to 505 days and provide for 90 days of intensive aftercare 
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such as Intensive Aftercare Program (IAP), Associated Marine Institutes (AMI), or group 
homes. While some research has found that there is little difference in rates of recidivism 
between youth who are incarcerated and those who are receiving intensive supervision, using 
intensive conditional release/probation/aftercare is less costly. The Washington State Institute 
for Public Policy estimates that about $18,000 per participant can be saved (Aos et al., 2001). 
In 1998, the Juvenile Justice Accountability Board (JJAB) recommended that more attention 
should be given to aftercare programming at the state and local levels (Florida Department of 
Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Justice Fact Book, 2000). Youth with systemic and high treatment 
needs require more comprehensive and targeted services. Similar to assessment for 
placement into a residential program, an objective risk assessment instrument should be used 
to identify risks and needs of youth and to provide appropriate services. Florida currently 
spends almost $100 million on residential care for high-risk and maximum-risk programs 
combined. NCCD estimates that the state can save approximately $4.4 million by 
implementing a combined sentence for 20% percent of youth in high-risk (n=465) and 
maximum-risk (n=24) facilities that reduces length of stay by 90 days and increases intensive 
aftercare services by 90 days.  
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OPTION 3 
Slightly reduced length of stays for a small proportion of youth in high risk and 
maximum-risk facilities coupled with intensive aftercare services. 
 
 
 
Admissions ALOS 
(days) 
Bed 
Days 
ADP Cost  
(In Millions) 
Maximum 122 595 72,590 199 $15.6 
High 2,329 336 782,544 2,144 $81.3 
20% 
baseline(maximum) 24 595 14,280 39 $3.0 
20% baseline (high) 465 336 156240 428 $16.3 
Combined 
alternative sentence 
total (max) 24 505+90   $2.6 
Combined 
alternative sentence 
total (high) 465 246+90   $12.3 
Cost savings 
(maximum)  $.4 
Cost savings (high)  $4.0 
  
Total cost savings 
(max+high) 
 $4.4 
 
Cost Savings of Combining all 3 Options 
 
While the aforementioned NCCD options are mutually exclusive, combining all three options 
could total a savings of approximately $42 million. The alternatives affecting the proposed 
number of youth (e.g., diversion to home-based care, combination of residential treatment 
and home-based care, reduced length of stay and increased aftercare) are supported by 
research and are cost-effective. Although these are “possible options,” they provide a picture 
of what the state of Florida can achieve. As mentioned, the state could also consider a 
strategy for gradual de-escalation of youth from high-risk programs into moderate-risk and 
low-risk programs, thus achieving more cost savings and improving the process and ability of 
youth to move through the continuum of services that DJJ operates. Such a response system 
allows for increased supervision and services as the youth’s behavior becomes more 
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delinquent, and allows for gradual de-escalation of those controls as the youth shows 
improvement. This option creates an opportunity to reduce the penetration of resources at the 
deep end while being able to reinvest resources in low- and moderate-risk programs. For 
example, 20% of youth in high-risk programs could serve 300 days and the remaining time in 
an appropriate moderate- or low-risk program. 
 NCCD is suggesting a strategic reinvestment of current resources. The options 
presented by NCCD could effectively free up resources that could be used to enhance a full 
range of high-level services including substance abuse and mental health, improved 
education, and vocational education as well as enhancing the all important aftercare for the 
youth remaining in residential care and returning to the community. Portions of these current 
resources could also be directed for recruiting, retaining, and training care and custody staff 
at existing programs. In 2001, KPMG found that the turnover rate for care and custody staff 
at residential programs was 55%. A cost model workgroup found that salaries at Florida DJJ 
were lower than comparable positions at the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC). In 
Florida, starting salary for a juvenile detention officer is $24,009 and $27, 651 for a juvenile 
probation officer. Salary for a care and custody staff person at a contracted provider is $16, 
640. However, starting salary for a correction officer at DOC is $28, 461 and $30, 928 for a 
probation officer. In comparison, a juvenile probation officer in the state of Georgia 
beginning salary range is from $30,000-$35,000 (NCJJ, 2003). Increasing salaries could help 
recruit and retain professionals to work with youth and to provide better, quality services. 
These resources could also be used to help strengthen services at the front end as well. 
Further planning will be required in order to implement these alternative options, including a 
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service plan that delineates a graduated approach for implementation, pilot programs and 
evaluation, and building judicial support.  
Cost 
Savings 
Current 
Cost 
NCCD 
Proposed 
Alternative
Difference 
(Savings) 
Option 1 $38.6 $13.9 $24.7 
Option 2 $44.4 $31.5 $12.9 
Option 3 $19.3 $14.9 $4.4 
Combining 
all options 
$102.3 $60.3 $42.0 
(All numbers refer to millions) 
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VII. Conclusions and Final Recommendations 
 
Based on the work of OJJDP and others, a clear picture has emerged about the core 
elements of a model system of graduated sanctions. If Florida were to move rapidly in this 
direction, the likely outcomes would be both reduced recidivism and reduced costs. While 
Florida has made some steps towards the model, there needs to be greater focus and 
consistency in this pursuit. 
The first principle of a model system of graduated sanctions is to have in place a 
broad array of sentencing options that are responsive to public safety concerns and youth 
needs. The juvenile justice system needs a flexible response system that can increase 
supervision and services as a youth’s behavior becomes more delinquent, and can gradually 
deescalate those controls as the youth shows improvement. The figure below illustrates this 
concept of graduated sanctions.  
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Graduated Sanctions 
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This idea assumes an interconnected continuum of programs, not just a set of 
independent contracts with providers. 
To plan for a very cost-effective system of graduated sanctions, the state would 
greatly benefit from implementing a research-based structured decision making system, and 
to actually use this system to make most juvenile justice decisions. This structured decision 
making process includes objective risk assessment tools, highly structured needs assessment 
profiles, and a strategy that links these measurements of risks and needs to existing sanctions. 
Further, an effective system of structured decision making includes tools for periodic 
reassessments that allow for the changing nature of youth behavior and circumstances during 
the supervision period. 
We have stressed the importance of utilizing the best research-based intervention 
approaches. Our preliminary analysis suggests that there are many highly successful 
programs involving intensive home-based services that are presently not being used or that 
are underutilized in Florida. Moreover, the State must augment its existing residential 
programs with well planned and well funded aftercare or reentry services. Very strong 
aftercare programs can substantially increase the success of residential services, and save 
money through reduced lengths of institutional stays. Further, since all of these youths will 
return to the community, the mechanism for making these returns successful are crucial to 
public safety. 
Finally, the research tells us that youths can be successful to the extent that they are 
effectively reconnected to positive or pro-social community institutions. Strengthening 
families should be a top priority. Young people need safe places to live, trustworthy people 
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on whom they can rely, and mentorship. Getting reconnected to schools and to the legitimate 
labor force have proven to be powerful pathways to success.  
Below are some of the priority recommendations that should be considered by the 
citizens of Florida: 
 
• Develop and implement a structured decision making model (SDM) which 
includes objective risk instruments and an effective operational grid for 
placement. 
• Improve DJJ’s forecasting ability for both placement beds and community-
based program slots to allow state officials to plan wisely for expenditures. 
• Expand the implementation of research-based programs. Florida needs more 
programs that provide wraparound, and other high quality models of home-
based care. 
• Re-energize local input into programming, including ways to channel more 
resources to the local level and to leave more discretion for programming to 
judges and community officials. Look at the strides made in Ohio, North 
Carolina, and other jurisdictions as potential approaches for Florida. 
• Revisit the guiding philosophy of the Juvenile Justice Act of 1990 calling for 
reduced juvenile justice caseloads and increased use of innovative alternatives to 
secure detention. In 1990, state officials wanted an expansion of community-
based commitment programs so that juvenile offenders could be served nearer 
their home communities. 
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• Undertake a serious examination of detention practices in Florida and examine 
the highly successful results of the Annie E. Casey Foundation Juvenile 
Detention Alternatives Initiative. 
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